ISSOUF SANOGO/AFP/Getty Images
Angolan police patrol during the African Cup of Nations in January 2010
Summary
A protest reportedly planned for Aug. 26 in Luanda by Angolan activist group Revolutionary Movement for Social Intervention (MRIS) is just one day away, though it is unclear if the demonstration actually will occur. STRATFOR sources claim MRIS is actually a creation of the ruling Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), and while this cannot be verified, it fits within the MPLA’s historical behavior. In any case, the MPLA will not permit social protests to advance into any meaningful mobilization.
Analysis
A protest reportedly planned for Aug. 26 in the Angolan capital, Luanda, by Angolan activist group Revolutionary Movement for Social Intervention (MRIS) is just one day away. The group, which has previously held small demonstrations, purportedly was formed to express socio-economic and political discontent with Angola’s ruling party, the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA).
The MPLA faces several kinds of opposition groups, from social activists like the MRIS; rebel groups, such as the Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda (FLEC), demanding regional autonomy, if not independence; and militant groups, notably the
Angolan Autochthon Resistance for Change (RAAM), which want full regime change. However, the government’s robust security services and an understood and demonstrated lack of hesitation to destroy any threat make it difficult for any opposition group to further its goals.
A large protest in Angola would be significant, but even a small protest, perhaps even numbering in the hundreds, is notable, given the
MPLA’s lack of hesitation to crack down and government opponents’ understanding the risks they face should they protest, including being killed. The regime is too deeply entrenched for political change to come simply through voting, and the
MPLA’s past behavior in dealing with opposition groups has been swift and often violent. It is thus unclear whether the MRIS protest will take place. Participants at previous MRIS protests have been arrested, and the MPLA government stands ready to arrest again this time. Angolan opposition leaders also are historically in danger of being detained or even kidnapped — STRATFOR sources say prominent human rights activist David Mendes of the opposition Popular Political party was arrested in November 2010 in Uige province and remains in the custody of Angolan security services. If the protest is permitted, it likely will be managed to small numbers.
Opposition militant and rebel groups in the country and neighboring countries are dealt with even more harshly. The Angolan security services, such as internal intelligence agency SINFO and external intelligence agency SIE, are robust and capable of conducting campaigns of deadly force, including infiltration of groups’ memberships, assassinations, kidnappings and poisonings. National borders are immaterial for either agency; the MPLA will order its intelligence agents to carry out cross-border operations against hostile Angolan dissidents or against foreign government officials understood to be harboring Angolan dissidents.
STRATFOR sources say that three leaders of the FLEC recently have been assassinated by the Angolan security services, and media reports corroborate this claim: FLEC head of staff Gen. Gabriel “Firefly” Pea was found dead March 2, military chief of staff Gabriel “Pirilampo” (Glow Worm) Nhemba was found dead March 14, and FLEC northern region operational commander Mauricio “Sabata” Lubota was found dead March 29. Pea and Lubota were found in the city of Pointe-Noire in the Republic of the Congo, which STRATFOR sources say is a rear-guard base for Angolan militant groups such as FLEC and RAAM. This has precedent — Angola’s main opposition party, the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), was primarily an armed force before its
military defeat by the MPLA in 2002, and it used both Congos as bases of support, training and logistics during the Cold War and in the 1990s. This effectively ended in 1997, when the Angolan government covertly worked to overthrow the Pascal Lissouba government in the Republic of the Congo and the Mobutu Sese Seko government in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (then known as Zaire).
Infiltration and assassination are not the only tools the MPLA uses. STRATFOR sources claim that the MRIS is actually a creation of the MPLA government, financed by SINFO. While this claim cannot be proven, it is notable. MRIS has no publicly recognizable leaders, only youth organizers who have coordinated protests at college campuses and through social media. Moreover, the MPLA has been accused of using this tactic before, creating opposition and financing opposition political parties — a STRATFOR source says this is true for all opposition political parties with the exception of UNITA and the National Liberation Front of Angola. Doing the same for a social activist group would not be beyond the party’s historical behavior. The MPLA could be using the MRIS both as a way to expose or manage internal political threats and to display a facade of democracy to the international community.
In any case, the Angolan government will not relax its grip willingly or peacefully. Powerful dissent exists in the country, but the MPLA’s swift reactions to any perceived unrest have compelled some dissenting factions to violence as a means of bringing about political change. The government’s relentless pursuit of its opponents also means that most committed militants will not reveal themselves until they feel powerful enough to defend themselves against the full force they expect the MPLA to launch against them.
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