Niger Becomes A Battlefield For Islamic State and Al Qaeda

Niger Becomes a Battlefield for Islamic State and al-Qaeda as They Expand in the Sahel NIGER Niger Earlier this month, gunmen stormed Niger’s main airport in the capital, Niamey. It was the second attack this year on the facility. The first, in January, was claimed by Islamic State Sahel Province (ISSP). The second, which killed 11 soldiers and two civilians, was claimed by ISSP’s rival, the al-Qaeda-linked Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM). The airport is a strategic target because it hosts military facilities, drone infrastructure and the headquarters of the Alliance of Sahel States, the bloc formed by Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso after their juntas seized power promising to defeat Islamist insurgencies. For militants, striking is a way to expose the gap between the juntas’ promises and their results and send a warning about the government’s shrinking control as the country becomes caught in a war between two competing terror groups. “(The earlier attack, in January,) shattered the city’s long-held reputation as a safer haven than its regional counterparts,” World Politics Review wrote. “The attack confirms both the growing strength and the strategic evolution of jihadist groups in the region, enabled by their expanding capabilities.” The attack shows Niger edging toward the dangerous pattern already seen in Mali and Burkina Faso in the central Sahel, analysts say. Islamist militants are pushing beyond rural strongholds to test state nerve centers, exploit broken regional ties and challenge government control. Niger is not lost yet, but unless it rebuilds intelligence, cooperation and civilian trust fast, it may soon be fighting to hold much more than its borders, analysts add. The airport attack “highlights a dangerous escalation in both the capability and ambition of these groups, marking a departure from localized rural insurgencies to coordinated strikes on vital national infrastructure,” said Héni Nsaibia, senior West Africa analyst at the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED). “The attack also fits a broader regional pattern of jihadist groups expanding their operational reach toward major population centers and critical infrastructure.” Niger now sits between overlapping jihadist theaters. JNIM is stronger across Mali and Burkina Faso, while Islamic State’s Sahel branch, known as Islamic State Sahel Province (ISSP), has built strength in western Niger and near routes toward Nigeria. The groups are rivals, but their competition can make the violence worse, not better, as each tries to prove reach, power and relevance. Niger recorded more than 1,900 violent deaths in 2025, with ISSP, JNIM and the Nigerien military all linked to civilian harm. “Niger is a territory of competition between them,” Wassim Nasr, a senior research fellow at the Soufan Center, told the Associated Press. “If JNIM loses the upper hand in Niger against the Islamic State, it will jeopardize its upper hand in Mali and Burkina Faso. … You have an open space like the Wild West, where each is looking to mark its territory.” The junta’s answer has been to promise more force and blame outsiders. After taking power in 2023, Niger’s junta expelled French and US forces and turned toward Russia. Niger then joined Mali and Burkina Faso in leaving the powerful regional bloc, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), weakening the regional cooperation needed against groups that cross borders with ease while aiming to expand to the coastal areas, analysts say. Some analysts argue that Niger remains better positioned than Mali and Burkina Faso to combat the insurgency. “Niger’s military is seen as more professional and disciplined than its Malian and Burkinabe counterparts,” the Sahel Research Group wrote. Niger has also largely avoided relying on civilian or ethnic militias, it added. Its capital is not under the kind of pressure Mali’s capital, Bamako, faced during JNIM’s recent fuel blockade, its government has not lost the same breadth of territory as Burkina Faso and its security forces repelled both airport assaults. Those advantages may buy Niger time, but not a way out. Analysts say it needs to rebuild the strategy weakened after Gen. Abdourahamane Tiani seized power in the 2023 coup. That means restoring security partnerships that provide intelligence and training, reviving cross-border cooperation against militants and showing restraint at home to avoid worsening grievances that insurgents exploit. “Niger before the coup was pursuing a strategy that was, by realist standards, coherent: building a balance of power through alliances and managing threats with available capacity,” Modern Diplomacy wrote. “The junta dismantled that strategy, triggered a new security dilemma, and worsened the very conditions it claimed to be remedying.”