Trevor Snapp/AFP/Getty Images
The Sudan People’s Liberation Army in the Nubu Mountains of South Kordofan on July 11
Summary
The Sudanese government has begun military operations against a South Sudan-affiliated militant group in the Sudanese border states of Blue Nile and Southern Kordofan. These states, north of the border but containing regions politically and ethnically linked to South Sudan, are key areas for both countries because of their oil reserves, and both countries can be expected to put significant resources toward controlling them. The contest will be protracted, and the possibility of U.N. involvement means it will not be settled for some time. But no matter the length, it is highly unlikely that South Sudan will formally engage in fighting.
Analysis
The government of Sudan since the beginning of September has been moving to consolidate its hold over its territory, particularly in the border states of Blue Nile and Southern Kordofan, in the wake of South Sudan’s July declaration of independence. Fighting broke out June 5 between the Sudanese army and South Sudan-affiliated militant group Sudan People’s Liberation Army-Northern sector (SPLA-N) after the group and its political wing, the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-Northern sector (SPLM-N), failed to heed a mandate to disarm or relocate to South Sudan by June 1. In the three months that these rebels have remained, aerial bombardments have spread from Southern Kordofan to Blue Nile state, where the north has escalated fighting. On Sept. 2, Sudanese President Omar al Bashir declared an emergency in the state, deposing Gov. Malik Agar and other members of the SPLM-N in Sudan. The Sudanese parliament Sept. 12 approved military operations against SPLA-N forces in Blue Nile and Southern Kordofan, and heavy fighting, including new aerial bombardments, was reported in the states starting Sept. 19. Since South Sudan’s independence, neither Sudan nor South Sudan has endorsed U.N.- and U.S.-mediated peace negotiations with the SPLM-N.
The border states are key areas for both Sudan and South Sudan due primarily to their oil reserves. Both can thus be expected to expend significant resources — Khartoum through its military and Juba by aiding the SPLA-N — to try to control them. Juba is aware of what little chance it has of controlling these Sudanese states and is instead hopeful that these rebels can help it maintain strategic military depth. Though a full-blown war between the two countries is unlikely, as
each requires the other to ensure continued oil revenue, Blue Nile and Southern Kordofan will continue to serve as leverage in ongoing negotiations between north and south.
Many parts of Blue Nile and Southern Kordofan, while north of the Sudan-South Sudan border, are politically and ethnically linked to the south. Before its members were removed from office, the opposition SPLM-N, itself an offshoot of South Sudan’s ruling party, represented 44 percent of government positions in both states per a previous agreement. During the yearslong secession negotiations, South Sudan funded rebel groups in the states as a means of achieving a better negotiating position through the creation of a buffer zone between oil resources in the south and Sudanese military forces in the north. Though it is not clear to what degree South Sudan still supports these rebel groups, historically it has served as the primary benefactor of the SPLM-N. Subsequently, Juba’s reluctance to encourage these affiliated rebels to relocate since independence has become suspect, eliciting warnings from both the United Nations and United States over potential linkages. This buffer zone of South Sudanese support in Sudanese territory gives Juba leverage in continued border transit, demarcation and oil-revenue sharing negotiations.
For Khartoum, these states contain almost all of the oil-rich regions within Sudanese territory after the South’s independence (about two-thirds of the countries’ total oil reserves are south of the border). Sudan’s freedom to maneuver in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile had been hampered by the presence of peacekeeping troops from the U.N. Mission in Sudan, but these troops were removed prior to independence, creating an opportunity for the Sudanese to engage in unfettered fighting over the territory with the SPLA-N. Around the time of independence, Ethiopian U.N. peacekeepers were deployed in the central oil-rich region of Abyei, but authorities from both Sudan and South Sudan have blocked the United Nations and other international organizations and governments from accessing these eastern states since the renewed fighting began.
Each side has a few options in their attempts to gain the upper hand.
South Sudan, still reliant on a pipeline that runs through the north as its only means of oil exportation, is very unlikely to start a full-scale armed conflict with Sudan. However, it does have the ability to continue funding Sudanese militant groups, such as the SPLA-N, which has held alignment talks with
Darfur-based Justice and Equality Movement. If Juba can increase funding to these groups — while mitigating risk to itself by publicly dismissing its connection to them — it will force the Sudanese army to stretch its resources across the country.
Nevertheless, Sudan has an interest in crippling both militant groups, so it will not hesitate to put all its resources toward such an offensive. It already has seen some success in its aerial bombing, driving thousands of people from Blue Nile and Southern Kordofan into Ethiopia and South Sudan, and it has called up more ground troops to assault remaining pockets of insurgents. Sudan will attempt to keep access to the area restricted; a renewed U.N. presence at the behest of the south would again limit Khartoum’s options and provide Juba with a buffer force. However, the reintroduction of the United Nations to the area will only serve to stagnate the conflict and restrict Sudanese and Southern Sudanese access to these states. Juba will use that option only as a last resort as it would likely expose their support of these rebel militias and delay cross-border transit and trade.
As neither country has enough resources at its disposal to overwhelmingly defeat the other, the contest over Blue Nile and Southern Kordofan will be long and involve several rounds of likely fruitless negotiations. South Sudan will continue to denounce their affiliation with SPLM-N, as South Sudanese President Salva Kiir Mayardit did in Khartoum on Sept. 21 in order to ensure oil-revenue negotiations continue. Juba’s support for SPLM-N also will be under increased scrutiny now that U.N. and South Sudanese forces have begun joint patrols just south of the conflict. Though the mission is to contain southern intra-tribal conflict, it allows both South Sudanese forces and the U.N. closer proximity to the fighting just north. This proximity could be used by South Sudan to more easily move equipment across the border to SPLM-N or give the U.N. more ability to cite injustices, mounting pressure to intervene. This mission alone means the conflict will not be settled for some time.
No comments:
Post a Comment